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WHY DO PLAINTIFFS SUE PRIVATE PARTIES
UNDER SECTION 1983?
Jack M Beermann*

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this article is why people make federal cases, under
section 1983,' out of claims they have against private parties. Section
1983 provides a cause of action against "any person" who, while acting
"under color of' state law, subjects or causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to a violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. The
requirement that the defendant act under color of law means that the
typical section 1983 claim is brought against state and local government
officials or entities, not against private individuals or entities. However,
there are situations in which a private party (i.e. a party that is not a
state or local government employee or entity) acts under color of law in
a way that causes the plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right, allowing
the private party to be sued under section 1983. While the color of law
requirement is the most significant of the complications that section
1983 adds to litigation, there are others. For example, because section
1983 is a federal statute creating a federal claim largely against state
officials, federalism concerns provoke courts to be very cautious about
extending section 1983 into areas that are seen as better addressed by
state law, such as the common law of torts.
Why, in light of these complications, would a plaintiff choose to
sue a private defendant under section 1983 rather than under other law
that is more clearly directed at private parties? While it might be
tempting to answer this question by asking attorneys and litigants
directly why they decided to bring their claims under section 1983, I
have chosen to pursue the somewhat less direct path of looking at the
incentives in the law for using section 1983. Assuming that litigants
and their clients are behaving rationally, and that success in the
litigation is measured by the amount of recovery (or by the value of a
non-monetary remedy), the fact that claims are brought is a strong
* Professor of Law and Richard L. Godfrey Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University
School of Law. Thanks to Adrienne Smith for excellent research assistance.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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indication that the law provides incentives to bring them. 2
Section 1983 has both procedural and substantive attractions.
These attractions, which are discussed extensively in this paper, lead
plaintiffs to take the risk that their claims ultimately will fail, as many
section 1983 claims against private parties do. In order to understand
why plaintiffs bring section 1983 claims against private parties, it is first
necessary to understand why plaintiffs bring section 1983 claims against
traditional state actors, such as state and local officials and entities. To
that end, after Part I of this article explores some preliminaries
regarding the role of section 1983 litigation against private defendants,
Part II addresses the reasons that plaintiffs bring their claims against
state and local government officials under section 1983 rather than (or
in addition to) state law. Part III explores why plaintiffs invoke section
1983 against private defendants. It describes the different types of
claims that plaintiffs typically bring against private defendants under
section 1983 and analyzes why plaintiffs choose to bring each type of
claim under section 1983 rather than under state law. Part IV concludes
with some general observations about the prospects for success of
section 1983 litigation against private defendants.

I.

PUBLIC VALUES AND SECTION

1983 ALTERNATIVES

Preliminary to a full exploration of the reasons why litigants sue
private defendants under section 1983, it is worthwhile to address the
context within which this use of section 1983 occurs. This section looks
at a pair of contextualizing issues: first, the potential of section 1983
litigation to inject public norms into otherwise private situations,
especially those involving privatization; and second, the fate of another
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (from which section 1983 is
derived) that might have been a better source of claims against private
defendants alleged to have violated or contributed to a violation of a
plaintiffs federal constitutional rights, section 1985(3).
A.

Public Values and Section 1983

Section 1983 litigation against private defendants brings legal
norms developed with regard to the conduct of public institutions and
2 This assumption may, of course, not always reflect reality. Parties may misjudge the
benefits of litigating or may pursue litigation for reasons unrelated to the probability of prevailing
on the merits and receiving a favorable judgment. In general, however, it is safe to assume that
parties take the likelihood of prevailing on the merits into account when they decide whether and
how intensively to pursue litigation.
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officials into the private sphere. Norms such as due process and
freedom of speech do not regularly apply against private parties, except
perhaps where the parties have agreed to observe them through private
contracts and other devices of private ordering. Insofar as section 1983
litigation subjects some private defendants to public norms, the domain
of these norms will tend to increase, perhaps ultimately spilling over
into private contexts that are not subject to section 1983 litigation. This
is especially relevant in the privatization context, in which private
parties (such as the operators of a private prison) may be subject to
section 1983 liability because they perform a government function.
In an example that should be familiar to students of section 1983
litigation against private parties, a private doctor under contract to
provide medical care to state prisoners is subject to section 1983
litigation over the adequacy of the medical care provided.3 The norms
governing the government's obligation to provide medical care to
incarcerated individuals under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments 4 were developed with regard to state actors and are quite
different from the norms that apply in medical malpractice litigation and
other private care controversies. Section 1983 litigation against private
doctors subjects ostensibly private persons to public norms.
This application of public norms to private conduct presents the
possibility that such norms could become more broadly applicable to
private parties much like a similar phenomenon that occurred in the area
of anti-discrimination norms.5 Governments in the United States have
long been subject to norms against racial discrimination. These norms
seeped into the private sphere through executive orders that applied first
to the employment practices of World War II-era defense contractors
and then later to all government contractors. The original orders, issued
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were strengthened by President
John F. Kennedy. 6 Given the volume of government contracting
covered by these executive orders, the existence of these orders eased
the way for the application of similar norms contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to a much broader sphere of private employment
practices. Today, the application of anti-discrimination law in the
private employment context is a well-accepted feature of the law of the

3 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
4 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses govern the rights of pre-trial
detainees to adequate medical care. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 24345 (1983). The Eighth Amendment governs the rights of post-conviction prisoners. See Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
5 For a fuller discussion of this point, with references, see Jack M. Beermann,
Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Privatefized] Entities, 49 UCLA. L. REV. 1717, 1730-34
(2002).
6 Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943); Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280
(1938-1943); Exec Order No. 10,925, 2 C.F.R. 329 (1995).

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

United States.
It is of course pure speculation to suggest that section 1983
litigation against private defendants, based on constitutional norms such
as due process, reasonableness in searches and seizures, freedom of
speech and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, might
similarly pave the way for the application of such norms to private
conduct generally. At a minimum, however, such litigation entails the
application of public norms to that limited segment of the private sphere
that satisfies "state action" and "under color of' requirements.
B.

Section 1983 's Alternative: Section 1985(3)

Another preliminary issue worthy of discussion is our absent friend
section 1985(3).7 A detailed explication of section 1985(3) is beyond8
the scope of this article, but a few observations are in order.
Confronted with continued private racial violence directed at AfricanAmericans and their friends and supporters, Congress included section
1985(3) in the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Section 1985(3) granted a
damages action against private conspiracies to deprive "any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities of the laws." 9 Section 1985(3) was
indisputably designed to apply to private conduct. It was directed at
conspiracies of two or more "persons" and contained no "under color of
law" requirement akin to that contained in section 1983. It also applied
to persons who "go in disguise on the highway" which (as the Supreme
Court only temporarily forgot) referred to a private organization, the Ku
Klux Klan.10
Section 1985(3) has had very little effect for three separate reasons.
First, although the Supreme Court now construes section 1985(3) to
cover private conduct, 1" it allows for section 1985(3) liability against
private defendants only when the defendants violate a constitutional

7 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000).
8 For a more detailed look at section 1985(3), see Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Court's
Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 199.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
10 The Court initially recognized that section 1985(3) was aimed at private conduct and for
that reason held section 1985(3)'s criminal counterpart unconstitutional. United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883). Almost seventy years later, the Court held that section 1985(3) was not
unconstitutional because it reached only state action. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651
(1951). Then twenty years after that, the Court reverted to its initial understanding and held that
section 1985(3) did, after all, reach private conduct, but only with regard to the narrow category
of rights that were capable of being violated by private parties. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971).
II Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); see also supra note 10.
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provision that applies to private conduct. 12 Second, the Forty-Second
Congress failed to anticipate the state action doctrine, which restricts the
application of most constitutional norms to state actors. Third, while
the Forty-Second Congress may have anticipated that the citizenship
and privileges and immunities provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
would create broad rights to federal protection against private
interference with civil rights, the Supreme Court has read those
provisions so narrowly as to render them virtually useless.13
Paradigmatic private conduct that the framers of section 1985(3)
may have viewed as violations of that statute include violence and
threats of violence designed to discourage African-Americans from
asserting their legal rights against whites, and from voting, owning
property, and engaging in business and other activities that would have
been viewed as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. In fact, the values behind such litigation would have
been viewed as public values, close cousins of the values underpinning
section 1983.
In the absence of these restrictive decisions, section 1985(3) might
have provided a viable remedy for many instances of private
interference with Fourteenth Amendment and related rights. Had the
Court read section 1985(3) and the Fourteenth Amendment (including
the privileges and immunities clause) more broadly, difficult section
1983 cases against private parties might have presented more
straightforward section 1985(3) claims. Alas, we will never know
whether section 1985(3) could have provided a simpler alternative to
the section 1983 action against private defendants, given how unlikely it
is that the Court's jurisprudence on these two fronts will change in that
direction.

II. WHY PLAINTIFFS USE SECTION 1983 AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS

In order to evaluate why plaintiffs bring section 1983 claims
against private defendants, it is helpful to look first at the general
incentives for bringing claims against government defendants under
section 1983 rather than under other, predominately state law, devices.
These incentives are both procedural and substantive, although the

12 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993). The only
constitutional rights that have been found to apply against private impairment are the right to
travel and the right to be free from involuntary servitude. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104-06.
13 For a very interesting elaboration of the role the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment might have played in supporting Congress's power to legislate civil rights, see
Rebecca E. Zietlow, CongressionalEnforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham's Theory of
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2003).
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division between the two categories is not completely clear. The major
procedural incentives include: the availability of attorney's fees for
prevailing plaintiffs; the ability to bring claims in federal court rather
than in state court or in a state claims tribunal; a potentially longer
statute of limitations; a potentially more generous measure of damages
(including the possibility of punitive damages); and the inapplicability
of various state procedural impediments, such as notice of claim
requirements or mandatory pre-screening where inadequate medical
care is alleged. There are also less significant procedural reasons why
some cases are brought under section 1983. For example, some
litigants, such as state prisoners, may feel more comfortable bringing
federal claims against their state antagonists, or section 1983 may be
one of numerous claims added to a complaint in which the litigant piles
on all remotely available claims.
While procedural factors, especially the potential for an award of
attorney's fees, are often very important to the decision to pursue
section 1983 claims rather than state law remedies, in many cases the
predominant attraction of section 1983 is substantive. The most
fundamental substantive reason for seeking remedies under section
1983 is that there may be no liability under state law for much of the
conduct that gives rise to section 1983 claims. State law also frequently
grants immunities to defendants that are inapplicable in federal section
1983 cases. Better remedies, such as a more generous measure of
damages and the possibility of punitive damages, may also be
characterized as substantive rather than procedural because they directly
implicate the value of the substantive claim. The remainder of this part
elaborates on the principal procedural and substantive attractions of
section 1983.
A.

Attorney's Fees

Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
(Attorney's Fees Statute)' 4 prevailing plaintiffs in section 1983 cases
are routinely awarded attorney's fees. On the whole, the Supreme Court
has construed this statute to favor plaintiffs, providing a significant
incentive to potential plaintiffs to bring section 1983 claims.
The Attorney's Fees Statute grants federal district courts discretion
to award "reasonable" fees to the "prevailing party" in cases arising
under enumerated civil rights statutes, including section 1983. Despite
its neutral language, the Supreme Court has read the statute to mean that
prevailing plaintiffs have a virtual entitlement to attorney's fees, while
14 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
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prevailing defendants are entitled to an award only in extreme cases of
claims brought wholly without merit. 15 The Court has also applied the
statute liberally in cases in which plaintiffs prevail on only some of their
claims, both as to whether they are considered "prevailing" for purposes
of entitlement to any fee award and as to how billable hours are to be
divided between claims on which the plaintiff prevailed and claims on
which the defendant prevailed, for purposes of calculating the size of
the award. 16 The Court's basic measure for determining the size of the
award, the number of hours spent times a reasonable hourly fee, 17 is also
liberal in that it holds the potential for awards much higher than the
traditional one-third contingent fee charged by attorneys in non-section
1983 injury cases. Although the fee award may be reduced if the size of
the award is out of proportion to the degree of the plaintiff's success,
the Court has nevertheless approved awards that exceed the amount of
the plaintiffs damages recovery where the Court perceived that the
litigation served public interests beyond the plaintiffs personal interest
in compensation.18
There have been some restrictive decisions regarding fees in civil
rights cases, but not enough to significantly dampen the attractiveness
of section 1983 to plaintiffs and, more importantly, their attorneys. In
one notable recent restrictive decision, the Court firmly rejected the
"catalyst" theory, under which the plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees
without a final judgment in his or her favor on the theory that the
lawsuit contributed to the defendant's decision to cease the challenged
conduct. ' 9 The Court held instead that only plaintiffs who prevail via a
court judgment are entitled to fees as prevailing parties, even if the
defendant would not have halted the illegal conduct without the filing of
the lawsuit. 20 In a second restrictive decision, the Court held that a
plaintiff who is awarded only nominal damages in a case in which
substantial damages were requested is ordinarily not entitled to a fee
award. The Court reasoned that, even though that plaintiff is technically
a prevailing party, under that circumstance an award would not be
"reasonable" as required by the Attorney's Fees Statute. 2' Finally, the
Court has decided that settlement agreements waiving attorney's fees
are enforceable. 22 This places the plaintiffs attorney in the awkward
position of being ethically required to transmit a settlement offer to his
15
16
17
18
19

See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 & n.2 (1983).
See Tex. State Teachers v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001).
20 Id.

21 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
22 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

or her client that is clearly against the attorney's own financial interests.
This may make the attorney less willing to represent civil rights
plaintiffs in the future.
While the availability of attorney's fees in section 1983 cases has
been diminished somewhat by these rulings, fees still provide a strong
incentive to use section 1983. In fact, it seems clear that sometimes
section 1983 is added as a basis for relief merely to support a fee award
even when relatively straightforward claims exist under other federal
statutes or even state law. 23 In at least one case, the possibility of a fee
award led the Supreme Court to decide that Congress intended to
displace section 1983 liability with a more specific statute not providing
24
for the award of attorney's fees.
B.

State ProceduralRules

Inhospitable state procedural rules may also make section 1983 an
attractive alternative to state law. One set of such state rules involves
statutes of limitations and special procedures that apply in certain cases
brought against the government. The Supreme Court has held, under a
choice of law provision that was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,25
that general state personal injury statutes of limitations govern section
1983 claims brought in federal court. 26 This period may, in many cases,
be longer than the limitations period for suing government entities or

23 A good example of this phenomenon involves cases in which a cellular telephone company
sues a local government over the government's refusal to allow the telephone company to erect a
cellular tower in a city or town. A provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(7) (2000), creates federal rights in such cases. In addition to asserting their rights under
the Telecommunications Act, plaintiffs have added section 1983 "and laws" claims against the
local government on the basis that the local government and its officials violated the Act under
color of law. See, e.g., APT Minneapolis, Inc. v. City of Maplewood, No. Civ. 97-2082
(Jrt/RLE), 1998 WL 634224 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1998) (allowing section 1983 claim and
attorney's fees in cell tower case); Sprint Spectrum v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass.
1997) (same). Because section 1983 did not add anything substantive to the rights asserted by the
plaintiffs in those cases, it appears that the only reason a section 1983 claim was pursued in
addition to the rights arising under the Telecommunications Act was to secure attorney's fees. A
co-author and I have expressed the view that attorney's fees should not be available in such cases
because, among other reasons, the Telecommunications Act provides a complete remedy. See
Clive B. Jacques & Jack M. Beermann, Section 1983 's "And Laws" Clause Run Amok: Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees in CellularFacilities Siting Disputes, 81 B.U. L. REV. 735 (2001). The
two federal courts of appeals to address this issue agree that fees should not be awarded in such
cases. See PrimeCo Pers. Communications, Ltd. P'ship v. City of Mequon, 352 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. 2003); Nextel Partners Inc. v. Kingston Tp., 286 F.3d 687 (3d Cir. 2002).
24 See Smith v. Robinson, 462 U.S. 992 (1983). It appears that Congress disagreed with the
Court's view. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(1999), providing that the statute involved in Smith v.
Robinson should not be read to foreclose relief under any federal law.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000).
26 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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officials under state law.
Section 1983 has a number of other procedural advantages. Under
some state tort claims provisions, a claim against an official might be
deemed a claim against the state and the only forum for such a claim
may be a state claims tribunal such as a court of claims. By contrast, in
most contexts, section 1983 provides for an immediate action in federal
or state court without any requirement that alternate remedies be
exhausted or pursued. 27 State notice of claim provisions, which require
plaintiffs suing state and local government entities to provide advance
notice of their claim and to wait a prescribed period for the government
to try to resolve the claim, do not apply to section 1983 cases, including
those brought in state court.2 8 Section 1983 claims involving medical
care while in state custody do not have to be presented to a medical
review panel, as some states require for malpractice claims. 29 This
ability to go directly to court means that a section 1983 plaintiff can
take immediate advantage of liberal discovery rules and other favorable
procedures that apply in court but might not apply in an agency or
claims tribunal.
Although some section 1983 plaintiffs bring their claims in state
court, many others choose federal court. Some plaintiffs may not trust
state courts and might view federal court as their only chance for a fair
shake, especially when their claims are against government entities and
officials. These plaintiffs may use supplemental jurisdiction to bring
both state and federal claims in federal court, even if their strongest
substantive claims arise under state law. 30 The reasons for preferring
federal court go back to the parity debate, and involve a perception that
federal courts are of higher quality and are likely to be more
sympathetic to federal claims than state courts. 3'
It should not be surprising that federal courts may be more
sympathetic to plaintiffs with federal section 1983 claims than state
courts. State judges are part of the same political community whose
actions or laws are being challenged by federal law. Federal judges
may develop a more national perspective. Their detachment from the
state political system, together with the structural protections of
independence they enjoy under the Federal Constitution, make them
more likely than state courts to recognize federal claims against state
27 Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
28 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
29 For example, in Indiana, "under Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act, a medical malpractice
action may not be brought against a health care provider until the claimant's proposed complaint
has been filed with the Department of Insurance and an opinion has been issued by a medical
review panel." Mayfield v. Cont'l Rehab. Hosp. of Terre Haute, 690 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ind. App.
1998) (citing Ind. Code §§ 27-12-7-1, 27-12-8-4).
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
31 See Michael Wells, Is Disparitya Problem?,22 GA. L. REV. 283 (1988).
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and local government.
C.

Substantive Reasonsfor Choosing Section 1983

While it is broadly recognized that procedural factors provide
significant incentives to bring claims under section 1983, substantive
factors may be an equally important incentive. Simply put, there are
many situations in which plaintiffs have no alternative to section 1983
because state law does not provide a realistic avenue of relief. For
example, in many section 1983 cases, the plaintiff argues that official
action of state or local officials or entities is unconstitutional. While all
state constitutions contain provisions that parallel those of the Federal
Constitution, both theory and experience suggest that state courts are
not likely to take the lead in declaring state policy or the actions of state
officials unconstitutional.
The simplest cases that illustrate this point involve situations in
which state law immunizes tortious conduct by government officials. In
such cases, plaintiffs may choose to bring section 1983 claims because
these immunities make recovery under state law impossible. Although
state immunities do not apply in section 1983 cases, it may be difficult
to make out a section 1983 claim on the merits when the essence of the
claim is a state law tort. In one example, a state prisoner made a federal
case out of a simple personal injury claim when state law immunized
32 In
the prison guards whose careless conduct led to his injuries.
another example, a victim of tortious conduct by an Ohio police officer
who was pursuing a suspect brought her claim under section 1983
because an Ohio statute immunized local governments and local police
and fire officials from damages caused by negligence during
emergencies. 33 The victim in that case had no state law alternative to
section 1983. These immunities and others like them mean that the
plaintiff will receive no compensation for injuries caused by the conduct
of the government entities or officials unless a federal claim is
successful. It should be noted, however, that because the due process

32 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
33 See Ohio R.C. § 2744.02(B)(l)(a) (2004). 1 participated in the litigation of a section 1983
case challenging this statute as applied to an innocent bystander whose automobile was destroyed
by the negligent conduct of a city police officer. The plaintiff was left without a remedy under
state law, so a claim was brought under section 1983. The effort was unsuccessful as both the
district court and the court of appeals upheld the statute. See Dworkin v. City of Columbus, No.
C-2-94-1217 (D. Ohio 1997). In fact, the court of appeals found the case so easy, it affirmed
from the bench and did not issue an opinion in the case. Dworkin v. City of Columbus, 162 F.3d
1161 (6th Cir. 1998) (tbl). I am still amazed that state law can authorize a local government to
negligently destroy a private citizen's property without violating any federal guarantee, such as
the takings or due process clauses.
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clause has been construed not to apply to negligent conduct, it is very
difficult to prevail on a federal claim in these circumstances. 34
Section 1983 may also be an attractive alternative to state remedies
limited by caps on compensatory and punitive damages. Damages caps
are common in claims against government entities. Although complete
governmental and charitable immunities were pulled back throughout
the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, many
states replaced complete immunity with liability limitations. For
example, Massachusetts has a $100,000 limit on municipal liability and
a total bar against punitive damages in personal injury cases against
government entities, including those against municipalities.3 5
In
contrast, section 1983 damages provide for complete compensation and
are not limited by state law. Of course, the difficulty of making out a
claim remains, but adding a section 1983 claim to a state tort claim that
is limited by a damages cap may present at least a glimmer of hope that
damages in excess of the cap might be recovered. In states that have
legislatively limited punitive damages, the limitations will not apply to
federal section 1983 claims, although section 1983 itself does not allow
punitive damages against municipalities. 36
More fundamentally, many provisions of federal law that are
enforceable through section 1983 suits may have no state law analog.
For example, consider the First Amendment rights asserted in the
Brentwood Academy case that Michael Wells discusses in his article for
this symposium. 37 There, a school claimed that an interscholastic
athletic organization's rule restricting recruiting contacts with
prospective student athletes violated free speech rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. In such a case, there simply may be no
colorable state law claim available which means that a constitutionallybased section 1983 claim is the plaintiffs only realistic choice. The
likelihood that no state law claim exists is greatest when state law itself
is alleged to violate the Federal Constitution, but it also exists when
state official conduct unguided by state law is alleged to be
34 In the Ohio case discussed above, an effort was made to convince the court to focus on the
immunity rather than on the negligent conduct of the officer. This was based on a suggestion in
an article I published on the subject, that immunities violate the Takings Clause insofar as they
result in property loss or damage without compensation in circumstances under which damages
would be recoverable against a non-governmental tortfeasor.
See Jack M. Beermann,
Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalismand State Sovereign Immunity, 68
B.U. L. REV. 277 (1988). The district judge held that insofar as the immunity precluded recovery,
the victim was not truly the owner of the property. This seems to me to be a radical reorientation
of property law under which the state can statutorily eliminate property rights without paying
compensation.
35 See M.G.L.A. c. 258 § 2 (2002).
36 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
37 Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in ConstitutionalLitigation: Reviving the Role
ofSubstantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2004).
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unconstitutional. In the former situation, it is very unlikely that a state
court would hold that a party has violated state law by following state
law, and such cases present the most obvious need for section 1983.
However, there are innumerable instances of official conduct that may
violate the Federal Constitution but would not give rise to any claim at
all under state law.
Of course, there is always the possibility that state courts could
develop state constitutional norms under their own constitutions and
provide relief. State constitutions all have provisions that recognize
rights similar, if not identical, to the rights contained in the Federal
Constitution, and some state courts recognize greater rights than those
recognized by federal law. In many situations, however, the state
constitution at best parallels the Federal Constitution, and the possibility
that the state constitution has been violated seems frequently not even to
be considered. 38 In my view, this is because state courts are oriented to
support the state, not to constrain state action. While state courts do
sometimes recognize state law rights against state action, a plaintiff who
has a choice could rationally conclude that his or her chances are better
in federal court under federal law than in state court, particularly given
the history of civil rights litigation.

III.

COMPARATIVE INCENTIVES IN PRIVATE SECTION

1983 LITIGATION

In this part I compare the incentives for section 1983 litigation
against private parties with the incentives for bringing section 1983
litigation against government officials and entities (as discussed in Part
II, supra). I describe the different types of section 1983 cases that are
brought against private parties, and then discuss the incentives for using
section 1983, rather than state law,,in each type of case.
A.

Self-help

One category of section 1983 cases brought against private
defendants arises out of self-help actions, like evictions, repossessions
and warehouse sales. 39 In these situations, state law establishes the
38 For example, in Moonnan v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Ky. 1980), residents of
Covington, Kentucky claimed that a Kentucky statutory procedure for detaching areas from one
city and annexing them to another violated their federal constitutional rights. The local
government context of the case suggests that the state courts might be expected to develop their
own norms pursuant to the state constitution. However, there is no evidence from the opinion in
the case that anyone even considered that the statutory procedure might violate the state
constitution even if it did not violate the Federal Constitution.
39 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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procedures under which the private party acts, and the usual claim is
that the procedure for carrying out the auction, repossession or other
action violates due process. Typical claims attack the procedure as
written in state law, but sometimes the claim is directed more
specifically at the particular procedure employed, because either state
law does not cover the issue involved or because the defendant departed
from state law in some respect. The fact that a private defendant was
engaged in self-help pursuant to a finely wrought procedure spelled out
in state law is not enough to establish that the defendant acted "under
color of' state law as required by section 1983. Rather, the state must
actively participate, for example by police assistance in an eviction or
by state officials conducting the sale of warehoused goods.
Why would a plaintiff try to bring a claim against a private actor
involved in self-help (as understood in this category) under section
1983? The best explanation is that state law is unlikely to be favorable
to the plaintiff, especially in those cases where the plaintiff alleges that
the state law violates due process and that the defendant followed state
law to the letter. It is very unlikely, if not unheard of, for a state court
to award damages against a defendant who followed state statutory law.
The statute would presumably provide a defense to any state tort claim
arising out of the defendants' conduct. The plaintiff might have a
contract claim if the defendant's actions were contrary to something in a
contract between the parties, but in most of the cases in this category,
any contract is likely to be a standard form with terms favorable to the
landlord or repossessing party.
A subcategory of cases related to the self-help cases (and
straddling the government function category discussed in Part III.B,
infra) involve private police and private security guards, which for
convenience I will refer to as "private police. ' 40 Many establishments,
including retail stores, restaurants, health care facilities, hotels,
apartment buildings, entertainment venues, and schools employ private
police to monitor the behavior of people using the premises. When a
large establishment, such as a shopping mall, housing development, or
university employs a substantial number of private police, the group
may resemble a police force. In some cases, these private police forces
are granted actual police powers by local authorities.
Individuals bringing claims against private police generally allege
that they were detained, harassed, physically abused, or otherwise
injured by private police.
Specific allegations include arrest and
detention without sufficient cause, racial profiling, or harassment and
discrimination against minorities in stores, assault and battery in
40 For examples of cases in this category, see Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir.
2003); Smith v. Brookshire Bros., 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975); Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874
F.2d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
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physical altercations with private police, and various additional
possibilities. Such claims can give rise to section 1983 litigation when
the private police act under color of law, for example by acting jointly
with local police, by exercising police powers granted by statute or by
the local police, and when private security is provided by off-duty
police in their official uniforms.
State tort law is likely to provide remedies for many injuries
Claims such as false arrest, false
inflicted by private police.
imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress may be available under state law for many of the
situations in which plaintiffs choose to sue private police. On the other
hand, there are also cases in which state law is not readily available.
For example, if private police are involved in suppressing speech and
assembly, the only apparent option for suit may be a constitutionallybased section 1983 claim.
The reasons for bringing claims involving private police under
section 1983 mirror the reasons in other situations. Attorney's fees and
the ability to litigate in federal court are likely to be big attractions. The
nature of these claims may, however, make the monetary remedies
available under section 1983 attractive. Cases involving excessive
force, false arrest and race-based harassment, for example, are likely to
present good claims for substantial compensatory and possible punitive
While section 1983 damages are
damages under section 1983.
injuries protected by tort remedies,
of
supposed to reflect the same sorts
it seems that damages also are available under section 1983 for the
deprivation of a right, as long as damages are not awarded for the
41
abstract importance of the right to our legal system. For example, the
Court has approved damages for the deprivation of the right to vote
42
even though the actual value of such a right is difficult to determine.
Constitutional claims may add value to a case simply by providing an
additional compensable injury-the denial of a right.
The possibility of receiving punitive damages also makes section
1983 attractive. While the Supreme Court has recently held that
punitive damages of more than nine times compensatory damages are
very likely to violate due process limits on permissible remedies in civil
cases, 43 some states have limited punitive damages even more
severely. 44 Punitive damages under section 1983, however, are not
41 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
42 See Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (cited with approval in Memphis Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 477 U.S. at 312 n.14).
43 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
44 The Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 433 n.6 (2001), citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting), noted Justice Ginsburg's earlier enumeration of many states that had
passed punitive damages reform legislation and noted that in the intervening five years, four more
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subject to state law limits. For example, while North Carolina limits
punitive damages to $250,000 or three times compensatory damages,
whichever is larger, 45 a plaintiff with a claim for compensatory damages
worth more than approximately $30,000 might be eligible to a larger
punitive award under section 1983 than under North Carolina state law.
B.

Privatization

Another category of cases in which private defendants act under
color of law and thus are subject to section 1983 liability is that of
privatization of government functions. 46 These cases involve the private
operation of prisons, the contracting out of various services (such as
medical care) within prisons, the private operation of public schools,
private security services in public buildings, and private welfare
benefits and service providers. In some cases in this category, such as
those involving private prison operators finding action under color of
law is relatively easy. Other types of cases are less simple, but
examples do arise in which plaintiffs claim that defendants in this
category have denied their federal rights under color of law.
Why would plaintiffs bringing cases in this category pursue federal
section 1983 litigation rather than or in addition to the claims available
to them under state law? Other factors may be at work besides the
availability of federal court jurisdiction, liberal compensatory and
punitive damages measures, and attorney's fees. When a state assigns a
public function to a private party, it may also extend public immunities
and procedures to such defendants. While states are free to create
immunities and special procedures in litigation under state law, they
cannot immunize their own officials or entities from section 1983
liability and cannot create procedural barriers to section 1983 litigation.
There are also situations in this category in which the existence of state
substantive law to redress injuries suffered at the hands of private
defendants may be unclear, and federal law enforced via section 1983
may be the only, or at least the most clearly, available remedy. In some
cases, such as claims involving medical care provided to incarcerated
persons, procedural and substantive barriers to state medical malpractice
litigation may make section 1983 liability an attractive alternative or
addition.
Are there reasons for bringing these claims under section 1983 that
states had passed statutes limiting punitive damages.
45 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-25 (2003). This limit was upheld as constitutional under the North
Carolina constitation in Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 562 S.E.2d 82 (N.C. App. 2002).
46 For more on privatization and public values, see Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and
PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001) and Beermann, supra note 5.
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differ from the reasons why persons incarcerated in publicly run prisons

would bring section 1983 claims? There are two relevant potential
differences. First, it may be easier to impose liability on an entity
running a prison when the prison is private than when the prison is
public. All state agencies are protected by sovereign immunity and thus
can never be sued under section 1983, in state or federal court, without
their consent. 47 Local governments are not immune but can only be
48
held liable under the Supreme Court's "municipal liability" test, a

strict standard of causation and culpability under which vicarious
liability is not allowed. 49 Some lower federal courts have applied the
50
Court's limits on municipal liability to private entities, but the
Supreme Court has never done so. Further, there are Supreme Court

section 1983 decisions holding private entities liable without reference

to the municipal liability test. 5' In those cases, the Court may assume

that normal common law vicarious liability standards should govern
private entity liability, just as the Court has applied common law
doctrines to fill gaps in section 1983 in other contexts. 52 If the law
ultimately settles this way, it will be much easier to hold private entities

liable than it is to hold government entities liable.
Second, the Supreme Court has decided that private section 1983

defendants are not entitled to the qualified immunity that applies in
53 It seems odd
section 1983 litigation against government employees.

that a private person acting under color of law may be easier to sue than
a public official. After all, the primary focus of the drafters of section
1983 focus was the conduct of public officials. The Supreme Court has,
however, left open the possibility that private section 1983 defendants
are entitled to a different good faith defense, and as we have seen in
47 There are two related doctrinal bases for this. First, federal court section 1983 cases
against states were prevented by the Court's ruling that states and state agencies are immune from
liability under the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974) (holding that a state has Eleventh Amendment immunity from section 1983 suit in federal
court). Second, section 1983 litigation against states in state court was eliminated by the Court's
holding that states and state agencies are not persons under section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (concluding that a state is not a "person" under section 1983
and thus may not be sued under section 1983 in any court).
48 The standard for municipal liability is usually referred to as a requirement that a municipal
policy or custom be the cause of the violation. As I have explained elsewhere, this is no longer
an accurate description of the legal standard. Under current law, a municipality may be held
liable either based on a policy or custom or a determination that a stringent standard of causation
and culpability has been met. For an elaboration of this view, see Jack M. Beermann, Municipal
Responsibilityfor ConstitutionalTorts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627-68 (1999).
49 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50 See Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1982).
51 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970).
52 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (referring to common law to construct
standard for punitive damages under § 1983).
53 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
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Sheldon Nahmod's paper in this symposium, 54 the lower federal courts
have recognized such a defense.5 5 If this immunity mirrors that enjoyed
by government officials, then the lack of official immunities for private
defendants will obviously not matter.
Even if there are some differences between section 1983 litigation
against public defendants and that against private defendants, why do
plaintiffs choose section 1983 and not state law claims in cases against
private defendants engaged in privatization? Here again, in addition to
attorney's fees, federal court jurisdiction and remedies, substantive law
may play a large part in making section 1983 attractive to plaintiffs.
Claims involving procedural due process, First Amendment freedoms
and other claims directed at private defendants may not have clear state
law equivalents. State law may not, for example, subject privately
employed public school teachers and administrators, welfare
caseworkers, or prison administrators to the same restraints to which
they are subjected by federal constitutional law, and section 1983 may
be the best or only available method of asserting claims deriving from
these restraints. In the case of a privately employed (or even publicly
employed) prison doctor, the denial of needed medical care may not
present a viable claim under state tort law. Normally, medical
malpractice involves mistakes in medical care, not simple failure to
provide care. Section 1983 may provide substantial damages for the
failure of a doctor under contract with the state to provide
constitutionally adequate care to a plaintiff in government, or
government-authorized, custody.
Plaintiffs may also have procedural reasons for preferring section
1983 litigation. As noted above, there are procedural impediments to
asserting medical malpractice claims in many state courts, such as case
screening by a medical panel, that do not apply to section 1983
litigation.5 6 Further, state law might apply the same procedures in suits
54 Sheldon Nahmod, The Emerging Section 1983 Private Party Defense, 26 CARDOZO L.
REv. 81 (2004).
55 Extended commentary on immunities for private section 1983 defendants is beyond the
scope of this paper. I must state, however, that it seems completely inconsistent with the
historical and policy bases of the section 1983 immunities to extend any sort of immunity to
private defendants. The immunities are based on a common law tradition of immunity and the
public interest in the performance of public officials. There is no corresponding history or public
interest regarding the conduct of private individuals. If private individuals violate constitutional
rights under color of law, the courts have no basis for creating a defense to liability, whether it is
the qualified immunity that government defendants receive or some new similar good faith
defense. Courts recognizing a good faith defense for private section 1983 defendants may be
concerned with fairness to the private defendant who does not realize that his or her conduct may
transgress constitutional limits. In response to this concern, it is important to note that the nature
of the conduct that gives rise to private defendant section 1983 liability is such that the private
actors should realize that there is a risk of some kind of liability. Most cases arise in contexts
involving obvious conflict where litigation should not be surprising.
56 See supra note 29.
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against private entities performing state functions that apply in suits
against the states, including short periods of limitation and notice of
claims requirements. Section 1983, in contrast, provides a relatively
long limitations period, the general personal injury period of the forum
state, 57 and notice of claim provisions do not apply in section 1983
litigation. 58 In general, section 1983 provides a simple, easy, and direct
route to court.
C.

Public Function

Another category of cases that may give rise to section 1983
litigation against private parties falls under the rubric of "public
function" or "government function." These cases are those in which a
private party has allegedly violated the Constitution in the course of
The
performing an exclusively public or governmental function.
in a
engages
who
reasoning underlying these cases is that a private party
function that is exclusively governmental should be subject to
There are two
constitutional restraints on governmental power.
cases: cases in
function
public
successful
categories of potentially
under a
challenged
is
which the exercise of private property rights
constitutional norm and cases involving privately administered
elections, such as party primaries. In truth, there is not very much to the
first category. The reasons plaintiffs bring section 1983 claims against
in these categories are largely, if not exclusively,
private parties
59
substantive.
Cases applying the public function doctrine to the exercise of
private property rights are few and far between, and it is unclear if the
doctrine would still be so applied without entanglement between the
private property owner and the government. While Justice Black's
opinion in Marsh v. Alabama,60 a case in which the Supreme Court held
that a state could not criminalize the distribution of religious literature
in a privately owned company town, makes no mention of the public

57 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
58 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
59 While many of the cases discussed in this section allege constitutional violations, those
which arose before section 1983 was revived in the early 1960s may not have been brought under
section 1983. In some of the opinions, no mention is made of the basis for the plaintiff's suit.
Federal courts of the time may have taken for granted that a claim of unconstitutional conduct
was available under general federal question jurisdiction and not paid much attention to the finer
points of the statutory basis for the claim. The absence of any explicit mention of section 1983
does not affect the analysis here, because the reasons for bringing a federal constitutional claim
track those for preferring section 1983 to a state law claim. Any case in which state action was
found could have been brought under section 1983, and likely would be today.
60 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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function doctrine, it was later characterized as relying on that doctrine. 6'
Marsh is instead a straightforward appraisal of the need to limit private
power to curtail the civil liberties of the inhabitants of company towns.
Marsh was later severely limited by a series of cases in which the Court
held that privately owned shopping centers were not state actors and
therefore were not required to respect First Amendment freedoms. 62
In the only other surviving Supreme Court application of the public
function doctrine to private property, a park had been entrusted to a city
under the will of a segregationist Senator. The Court held that the city
could not avoid its duty to end segregation in the publicly administered
park by resigning as trustee to make way for the appointment of a
private trustee. 63 The Court ostensibly relied on the public function
doctrine, but in my view it was not the abstract notion that
administration of a park in a city is an exclusively governmental
64
function but the "momentum [the park] acquired as a public facility,
after years of public administration, coupled with indications that the
city had continued to maintain it even after the appointment of a private
trustee, that led to the Court's holding. After the Court's decision, the
Georgia courts ruled that the Senator's trust had failed because he
would not have created a trust for an integrated park. The Supreme
Court upheld the reversion of the park to the Senator's heirs, finding
that the Georgia courts had applied settled law in a racially neutral
65
way.
The second area in which the public function doctrine has been
used to find state action involves privately conducted elections, such as
party primaries. The Supreme Court has consistently relied on the
notion that conducting a primary election is a government function to
find state action in order to subject those conducting the elections to
constitutional norms. 66 Thus ended racially discriminatory primary
elections.
In the private property public function cases, the primary reason
for invoking constitutional norms (via section 1983 or any other
vehicle) is substantive. State property law clearly conflicts with federal
constitutional norms. The only way that constitutional rights will be
recognized on private property (like the free speech rights at issue in the
company town and shopping center cases) is if the property owner is
held to be a state actor. It is otherwise very rare for state law to
recognize rights analogous to First Amendment speech rights on private
61 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,

352 (1974);

see also ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 499 (2d ed. 2002).

62 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
63 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
64 Id. at 301.

65 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
66 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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property, except for the owner's own First Amendment right to control
speech on the property. 67 Making out a federal case may entail
procedural advantages as well, but a potential plaintiff really has no
choice between federal and state law. In these cases, it is federal law or
nothing.
The reasons for making federal constitutional cases over racial
exclusion in primary elections are similarly substantive. The first of
these cases, which hit the Supreme Court in 1927, involved a Texas
state statute which prohibited blacks from voting in the Democratic
party primary, leaving the plaintiffs with no real alternative to a federal
claim. 68 In 1935, after another failed attempt by Texas to officially
exclude blacks from voting in the Democratic primary, the state handed
69
control over voter qualifications to the Democratic party itself, an
70 That arrangement lasted
arrangement upheld for lack of a state actor.
nine years until, in 1944, the Supreme Court held that the Democratic
Party was engaged in a public function when it conducted its primary
election, and that it was unconstitutional for it to exclude blacks from
voting. 7 1 This doctrine was reaffirmed and applied expansively in 1953
in another case from Texas. 72 Texas law likely did not prohibit racial
exclusion from primary elections at that time. Even if it had progressed
to that point in the 25 years after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
de jure discrimination in state-run primaries, the federal forum probably
appeared much more hospitable to the challenge to privately held
discriminatory primaries than the Texas state court system.
Further examples of attempts to use the public function doctrine
in the area of education. 73 The Supreme Court has refused to
mainly
are
extend the public function doctrine to include either the provision of
education or the regulation of interscholastic athletic competition,
except in cases in which the governmental and private entities are
entangled to such an extent that they appear to be acting jointly, a

67 Some states may be more liberal in applying free speech norms to private entities under a
public function type rationale. For example, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires some
private entities to respect free speech rights in circumstances similar to what might exist under a
broad reading of the public function doctrine. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12, §§ lH-I (1986);
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988).
68 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (striking down white primary).
69 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
70 Id. at 45-55.
71 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
72 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
73 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), held that the public function doctrine did not
make a state actor out of a private school that received almost all of its income from government
payments to educate special needs students who could not be handled by the public schools. The
plaintiff was a teacher who alleged that she was fired in retaliation for constitutionally protected
speech. The Court also rejected an entanglement argument, that the school was so entangled with
the state that it was a state actor.
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situation discussed in the following section. 74 The reasons behind the
attempt to expand the public function doctrine in this way seem
substantive-there is no clear private law analog to the free speech and
due process rights asserted against the private entities in these cases.
In sum, substantive considerations are the primary motivation for
employing the public function doctrine to transform private parties into
state actors for constitutional purposes, because the only realistic
substantive claims that plaintiffs have in these situations appear to be
federal constitutional claims involving free speech or due process.
D.

JointAction, Entanglement, and Conspiracy Cases

The final category of private defendant section 1983 cases
addressed in this article are joint action, entanglement, and conspiracy
cases. This category captures a disparate group of situations including
cases in which public and private parties work together to perpetuate
unconstitutional conduct; cases in which public and private parties
actively conspire to deprive people of their constitutional rights; and
cases involving private entities that are so entangled with government
that they are considered to be state actors acting under color of law for
Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983 purposes.
The most well known joint action case is Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co.75 In Adickes, the operators of a private department store allegedly
worked jointly with the police to maintain racial segregation at the
store's lunch counter. Merely calling the police to enforce the law is
not sufficient to turn the private party into a state actor. Rather, there
must be joint action so that the police and the private party are working
together in a common plan. 76 The reason for suing under section 1983
in this case seems pretty clearly related to substantive law. During the
1960s when the case was brought, state law was very unlikely to
provide a remedy against segregation in restaurants. In many places,
such segregation was a strong custom and may have even been legally
required. 77 Even if segregation was illegal by the late 1960s, it seems
74 Compare Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) with
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). In Tarkanian
the Court held that the National Collegiate Athletic Association was not a state actor, partly on
the ground that the regulation of intercollegiate athletics is not a purely government function. In
Brentwood Academy, however, where eighty-four percent of the members of the state association
were public schools and the public schools had a very strong influence on the rules applied by the
private association, the Court found state action.

75 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
76 See id.; Smith v. Brookshire Bros., 519 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1975); Barrett v. Harwood, 189
F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 1999).
77 For example, in Birmingham, Alabama, people were repeatedly arrested for violating local
law that required segregation in all facilities open to the public. After Major League Baseball
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unlikely that a state judge applying state law would have been very
aggressive in providing remedies to victims of unlawful racial
segregation.
Joint action among state officials and private defendants is also the
basis for finding action under color of law in the self-help cases
involving repossessions, evictions, and warehouse sales. Such action is
under color of law only when government officials take an active role in
the defendant's conduct. Racial discrimination has also been behind
some efforts to base section 1983 cases on private entanglement with
the state. In one case, private owners of a restaurant on publicly owned
property were held to be state actors when they refused to serve
blacks.7 8 In a contrasting case, a private club was held not to be a state
actor merely because it held a state-granted liquor license. 79 And in a
due process claim over termination of service, an electric company was
held not to be a state actor despite its state-granted monopoly and
extensive state regulation. 80 In all of these cases, the underlying merits
of the claims, rather than any perceived procedural advantage to section
1983 litigation, were behind the choice to bring suit under section
1983.81 In the race cases, state law would not have provided a basis for
relief against the alleged discrimination. In the electricity termination
case, the utility presumably followed the procedures required by state
law before terminating the service, and the plaintiffs only hope for
relief was based on federal due process norms. It would be unusual for
state law to condemn itself as unlawful.
Other joint action cases involve the eviction and related cases
discussed above in the self-help section and also cases involving private
security guards in stores, shopping centers, residential apartment
buildings, businesses, and even university police. If the private police
are granted police powers under state law, it is very likely that they act
under color of law in all their official actions. If, however, they are
purely private employees, then a finding of action under color of law
For
depends on active government involvement in the activity.
example, private security guards do not act under color of law simply by

became integrated, this requirement prevented Major League exhibition games from being played
in Birmingham, because the league would not play to a segregated audience. See DIANE
MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 84-86 (2001).
78 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
79 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
80 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
81 It is actually not clear from the opinion that section 1983 was the basis of Burton, but if it
were brought today, it would be, since the constitutional issue was raised offensively by the
plaintiff rather than as a defense to some other action by the defendant. Section 1983 has become
the primary device for asserting constitutional claims against state and local officials (and private
entities alleged to be acting under color of law).
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detaining a shoplifter and then calling police. 82 However, if the police
participate in the investigation and detention along with the private
guards, then the private guards may be acting under color of law.
In the joint action cases involving private police, section 1983 has
both substantive and procedural advantages to state law alternatives. In
cases concerning police involvement in evictions and related self-help
activities, using section 1983 to seek damages and declare the state law
unconstitutional may provide the only substantive possibility since the
participants may follow state law to a letter. In shoplifting and other
arrest situations, procedural factors, including attorney's fees,
availability of a federal forum, and a long statute of limitations, may
predominate (or at least be very important) because state law torts such
as malicious prosecution and false arrest present alternatives to section
1983 litigation.
In my view, the private police and the athletic regulation cases
illustrate that the joint action theory is a more promising theory than the
public function doctrine for finding state action and action under color
of law. Private police are ubiquitous, and any holding that policing is
an exclusively public function would have far reaching implications for
many institutions. It is only when the private police engage in joint
activity with public police that they are held to act under color of law.
The same is true with regard to regulation by voluntary associations,
such as athletic boards. The difference between the NCAA in
Tarkanian and the Tennessee High School board in Brentwood
Academy was not the function they performed but the degree of state
involvement in the regulatory process. 83 This reasoning could be
extended to additional private entities, such as engineering associations,
that promulgate building or traffic standards followed by governmental
members-they are only state actors if the regulatory process is
dominated by or heavily intertwined with state actors. In these cases,
the substantive attraction of due process and free speech norms, rather
than any procedural advantage, explains why section 1983 is used to
challenge the decisions of such entities.
Another class of joint action cases involve conspiracies among
private parties and government officials to violate constitutional rights.
These cases tend to arise in criminal justice contexts. Convicted and
sometimes exonerated criminals sue over alleged conspiracies among
judges, prosecutors, police, defense attorneys, and witnesses to
wrongfully prosecute and convict. 84 Private defendants, including
82 See Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001); White v.
Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979).
83 See supranote 74.
84 Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984). It sometimes appears that convicted criminals and
criminal defendants are paranoid and sue everyone involved in their arrest and conviction. Given
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defense attorneys and witnesses, act under color of law when they take
part in such conspiracies. Here, there may be overlapping state
remedies for malicious prosecution and such, but state law norms may
not be identical to the constitutional restraints on such conspiracies. In
any case, the prospects for prevailing in this type of litigation are very
small: judges, witnesses, and prosecutors, while engaged in the
prosecutorial aspects of the case, are absolutely immune from damages;
other state officials, such as police officers and prosecutors engaged in
investigation, have qualified immunity; and private defense attorneys
and public defenders may be entitled to the good faith immunity that
85
some courts have recognized for private section 1983 defendants. It
may be difficult to win using a good faith defense if a conspiracy to
unjustly imprison the plaintiff is proven, but there are additional hurdles
before any damages or injunctions would be awarded. First, section
1983 may not be used to procure release from state confinementhabeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for that. 86 Second,
section 1983 damages are available only after the plaintiff has prevailed
in the criminal proceedings, 87 a requirement stemming from the
common law of malicious prosecution (and so likely to apply to state
claims as well as section 1983 claims). That said, if all of the
requirements are met, plaintiffs suing over wrongful convictions and
prosecutions are likely to be powerfully attracted to section 1983's
promise of attorney's fees, federal jurisdiction, and damages unlimited
by state law restrictions. Favorable federal substantive law may also
and such plaintiffs are
play a role in the decision to add a federal claim,
88
likely to raise both state and federal claims.
In sum, a combination of procedural and substantive factors
explain why plaintiffs bring section 1983 claims against private
defendants in the joint action, entanglement, and conspiracy contexts.
In all these cases, however, substance appears to dominate over
procedure because many of these types of section 1983 suits are brought
the number of exonerations of wrongfully convicted persons in recent years, including persons on
death row, some of these section 1983 plaintiffs may be right, that everyone is after them for no
good reason.
85 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
86 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
87 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
88 The relationship between the common law tort of malicious prosecution and constitutional
law is somewhat unclear. Some have argued that all malicious prosecution committed under
color of law automatically violates the United States Constitution. A plurality Supreme Court
opinion, in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994), observed that the lower courts are
divided on this question, but the Court did not answer the question in that case. Rather, in
Albright, the Court merely held that malicious prosecution does not necessarily violate
substantive due process. This does not mean that malicious prosecution does not violate some
other constitutional provision such as procedural due process or the Fourth Amendment. For a
recent, extended discussion of the relationship between malicious prosecution and the
Constitution, see Castellano v. Fragozo,352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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when there is no well-established state tort law analog to the federal
rights allegedly violated by the putative state acting private entity.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN SECTION
AGAINST PRIVATE DEFENDANTS

1983 LITIGATION

The volume of section 1983 litigation against private defendants is
substantial enough for there to have been significant doctrinal
developments in the area, largely concerning state action and
immunities for private defendants. Are the prospects for success in
such litigation great enough to justify the volume of litigation? In
general, plaintiffs should be less likely to prevail in section 1983 cases
against private defendants than in cases against state officials because of
the additional possibility of losing due to a finding of no state action or
no action under color of law. In private entity cases that do get past the
state action/under color of law hurdle, the plaintiffs prospects for
success should mirror his or her prospects in state official litigation
unless other issues turn out to be different in cases brought against
private defendants.
The question of why plaintiffs sue private defendants under section
1983 cannot be answered by comparing litigation against public
officials with that against private parties. Rather, the real issue is
whether a plaintiffs prospects are better under section 1983 than under
the alternatives, whether they be suits in tort, contract, or perhaps
brought according to a state law claims process. Assuming that the
decisions leading up to filing suit are rational, and taking both
procedure and substance into account, then the simple fact that the cases
are brought under section 1983 should be a strong indication that
section 1983 presents a plaintiff's best choice.
In many cases, plaintiffs are likely to combine section 1983 claims
with other claims. As long as the section 1983 claim is not frivolous
(and thus unlikely to provoke a penalty from the court) it is relatively
cheap to add to a set of other claims. The payoff from adding the
section 1983 claim may be great, including the availability of federal
jurisdiction and the possibility of an award of attorney's fees. So even
if the most likely victorious claim is not the section 1983 claim, it
should not be surprising that section 1983 claims are included in
complaints stating multiple claims, and that resources are expended on
litigating them.
In the categories of cases in which section 1983 provides the only
realistic substantive claim on the merits, it is of course more likely to be
successful than any alternatives. Further, if the plaintiff has missed a
state filing deadline either under a statute of limitations or a notice of
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claim provision, section 1983 may be the only realistic possibility left at
the time of filing. Other procedural factors, such as the inapplicability
of procedural impediments to filing medical malpractice claims, may
make section 1983 preferable to state law alternatives.
Whether section 1983 is preferable to alternative claims brought
against private defendants does not address whether section 1983
litigation against private defendants is very likely to be successful as an
absolute matter. On one level, if success is highly unlikely, it would be
difficult to explain why so many claims are filed. If it turns out that all
defendants in such cases enjoy some sort of good faith immunity, and if
private entities are protected by an analog to the Monell rule that
protects municipalities, then the prospects for damages recovery against
private defendants will be greatly reduced.
These possibilities,
combined with a relatively strict state action/under color of law
requirement, would make it likely that good section 1983 claims against
private actors would be few and far between. In the face of such long
odds, continued section 1983 litigation against private defendants may
indicate a symbolic use of litigation, in which public interest oriented
litigants or lawyers use the legal system to pursue normative goals. In
particular, litigants may be making a point relating to private use of
state power, that when constitutional values are threatened by private
actors, they ought to be subject to the same constraints as public actors.
What is important are the constitutional values at stake, not the identity
of the party threatening them.

